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Several of the most significant recent historical discussions of poststructuralist theorizing are grounded in literary sociology, particularly in its Marxist variants.1 Shimmering in the moral twi-
light between elite scholarship and imaginal political activism, they pro-
pose to account for the emergence of poststructuralism by thinking the 
unthought—material, unconscious—conditions of its existence, envisag-
ing a clarification of history that might deliver us from its irrationality 
and cruelty. Despite their historical dimension, such accounts thus offer 
a “theory of theory,” as they are ultimately grounded in a philosophical 
act that the theorist performs on himself: the self-clarification of the 
unconscious determinations that have prevented theoretical reason 
from obtaining critical insight into reality.2 Terry Eagleton thus ties 
the emergence of post-’60s theory (poststructuralism, deconstruction, 
cultural studies) to a particular feature of late twentieth-century capital-
ism: namely, its capacity to incorporate culture itself into the mode of 
economic production through the intensive use of intellectual expertise. 
In a redolent dialectical formulation, Eagleton then retrieves theory’s 
unthought by arguing that this economic incorporation of culture 
gives new importance and power to cultural theorists—keeping alive 
the prospect that late capitalism might yet create the subject capable 
of seeing through it—while simultaneously ensuring that this promise 
remains unfulfilled. By imbuing them with a predisposition towards 
idealism, formalism, and relativism, late capitalism apparently renders 
theorists incapable of thinking the material and economic conditions 
of their own activity.3
Riffing on similar themes, Fredric Jameson has recently argued that 
history’s dialectical oscillation between thought and its material condi-
tions is not the product of a particular dialectical philosophical culture, as 
falsely claimed by the present author. Rather it arises from a fundamental 
and inescapable scission or “permanent gap” between subject and ob-
ject. This means that the hermeneutic task of thinking the unconscious 
conditions of thought is one imposed by man’s ontological-historical 
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existence as such, rather than by university courses in Marxist literary 
theory.4 The attempt to evade this task by undertaking an empirical 
history of poststructuralist theorizing without utilizing the hermeneutic 
key of late capitalism will thus amount to a dereliction of the universal 
duty to think the unconscious determinations of thought—probably a 
dereliction brought about by these determinations themselves, in the 
form of an “anti-intellectualism” that serves a “probusiness agenda.”5 
In treating the empirical historiography of poststructuralism as yet an-
other symptom of the failure to think theory’s unthought conditions, 
however, Jameson courts the doctrinaire philosophical preemption of 
a rival method of historical inquiry. This is especially the case if that 
historiography proposes to treat the task of thinking theory’s unthought 
conditions as an object of historical inquiry, rather than as an ethical 
imperative to which everyone living under late capitalism is subject.
There are several books and essay collections dealing more explicitly 
with the history of structuralism and poststructuralism, from which of 
course there is much to be learned.6 Some works nominating themselves 
as histories of poststructuralism, however, turn out themselves to be 
exercises in poststructuralism whose commitment to the self-reflexive 
thematics of fluidity and indeterminacy means that they pose no historical 
question.7 Other works do offer an historical narration—for example, 
of the transposition of German transcendental phenomenology into 
French theory, or the transposition of French theory into American 
deconstruction—but in a manner that fails to break free of the self-
understanding of their subject.8 These are works that track the travels 
of such themes as the indeterminacy of meaning, or the subversion of 
identity, without inquiring into how meaning is rendered indeterminate 
or identity subverted; in what cultural and pedagogical contexts such ap-
parently subversive activities might be instituted and valorized; and what 
cultural purposes or programs might be pursued through such specialized 
intellectual activities. Finally, there are some studies that have indeed 
helpfully approached the history of theory in terms of intellectual activi-
ties undertaken in particular contexts.9 These studies though have been 
hamstrung by their reliance on a philosophical-historical conception of 
context, understood as the hermeneutic space in which a-temporal ideas 
are realized or obscured by their material circumstances.10 It seems to 
me that this conception has short-circuited investigation into the specific 
character of the intellectual activities that constitute poststructuralist 
theorizing, and thence into the kinds of historical context in which 
these activities have been undertaken.11
Let me signal my departure from both social theory and philosophi-
cal history by proposing some empirical theses regarding the history 
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of poststructuralist theory, presented both as hypotheses requiring 
the support of historical evidence, and as recommendations for the 
redescription of particular kinds of intellectual activity. Seen from the 
standpoint of contextual intellectual history, poststructuralist theory can 
be understood as a development of European university metaphysics, 
specifically of its most recent form: the metaphysics of transcendental 
phenomenology elaborated by Edmund Husserl in 1920s Germany 
and then quickly improvised on by his unfaithful apprentice Martin 
Heidegger. If this post-Kantian metaphysics is understood as a particu-
lar culture of intellectual self-questioning and self-transformation, then 
we can propose that poststructuralist theory emerged during the 1950s 
and ’60s when this culture of metaphysics was taken up into an array of 
adjacent intellectual disciplines, undergoing a series of geointellectual 
translations, in a process of academic assimilation and transmutation 
that still continues.
For poststructuralist theory to be historically understood as a series 
of improvisations on the post-Kantian form of European university 
metaphysics, it requires a historiography that keeps its distance from 
two rival parties: from the enemies who treat it as “fashionable non-
sense,” and the friends who regard it as remembering a Being that was 
forgotten by reason. Such a historiography is confronted by a double 
task. First, it must provide an account of post-Kantian metaphysics as a 
particular kind of intellectual activity and academic culture, initially a 
highly recondite, perhaps even esoteric one, confined to a certain kind 
of regional philosophy faculty. Then it must outline how this form of 
metaphysical thought was transmuted into an academic culture capable 
of being taken up in a variety of paraphilosophical and nonphilosophi-
cal disciplines: literary studies, psychoanalysis, political theory, even 
historiography and jurisprudence. It was from this complex of develop-
ments that there emerged the array of exoteric hermeneutic disciplines 
known generically as poststructuralist theory. Needless to say I will not 
be attempting a discursive narration of these developments in the pres-
ent paper. Instead I propose to offer a series of historical snapshots of 
particular artifacts and scenes. These might be regarded as analogous 
to crime-scene-investigation photos, from which we can begin to piece 
together the narrative chain of past events.
I. Two Examples
We can begin by logging two documents of the poststructuralist 
discourse that we are seeking to redescribe as a particular kind of intel-
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lectual activity. These texts—a chapter on Jules Verne from Michel de 
Certeau’s Heterologies and Jacques Derrida’s “Force of Law” essay—both 
date from the late 1980s. As American translations of something known 
in its transatlantic dissemination as “French theory,” they document a late 
stage in a complex chain of intellectual innovations and geointellectual 
transpositions and receptions. The proximate starting point of this chain 
is to be found in 1920s German university metaphysics, although we will 
see that it reaches back well beyond this. 
De Certeau’s text takes the form of a series of hermeneutic operations 
performed on Verne’s travel writings. At the center of these operations 
we find a literary version of the Husserlian and Heideggerian doctrine 
that in attempting to know the world man only succeeds in projecting 
his own formal preconceptions onto it. The world thus emerges as a 
simulacrum of the instruments used to know it, leaving a more profound 
reality, “Being,” in obscurity. De Certeau thus characterizes Verne’s ex-
plorers and cartographers as engaged in a vast scribal concealment of 
Being through processes of mapping and naming. He presents Verne’s 
account of the colonization of Pacific islands as symbolic of the semantic 
colonization of Being that takes place through the projection of words 
and maps:
Essentially, Verne’s explorers are name-givers; they contribute to the world’s 
genesis through nomination. . . . The explorations semanticise the voids of 
the universe. Their durations, accidents, episodes, and trials metamorphose 
into words which fill the indefinite expanses of the sea . . . The voyages write 
the Pacific’s great white page: graphs of journeys and words (fragments) from 
histories traced on maps.12
This occlusion of Being, though, is only a prelude to the possibility of its 
hermeneutic disclosure, the distinctive feature of which is that it is not 
something that is achieved intentionally, by Verne or by his readers, but 
happens as if by chance. It is thus through the unexpected breaches or 
delays in Verne’s narrative that the world is glimpsed not in accordance 
with our projections of it, but as something “other.”
De Certeau thus undertakes a reading in which breaks in Verne’s nar-
rative are interpreted as symbolic expressions of the rupturing of the 
semantic colonization of Being, such that the literary-theoretical read-
ing executes a metaphysical task. In this manner, the literary-theoretical 
reading performs a describable abstractional operation on its source 
text, annexing the travel narrative to German university metaphysics by 
renarrating it as a symptomatic or symbolic expression of the ruptural 
self-disclosure of Being. De Certeau performs this supervening meta-
physical operation in order to set the hermeneutic scene for his readers 
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to relate themselves to Verne’s text on this newly elevated cultural level. 
His reading is thus scene setting for an act of inner philosophical trans-
formation: “The narrative creates stop-off points. . . . There is even, in 
the heart of the Pacific, a point of delay of tarrying, a paradisiac trans-
gression of work, a pleasure place.” At the center of this philosophical 
metatravel narrative, de Certeau evokes the still space in which Being 
can be glimpsed, but only in a state of illuminated lassitude, presented 
as a feminine space outside the reach of thrusting semantic colonization. 
Engaged in the imaginative ritual of a kind of philosophical metanovel, 
de Certeau’s readers are prepared to participate in this heightened state 
through which a transformative “other” can enter consciousness, here, 
perhaps somewhat jarringly, in the form of the indigenous or native: 
“From there and nowhere else come the native, the other introduced 
into the fellowship of the explorers. Through the native, the reality of 
the elsewhere causes the voyage to drift, it diverts it, anchoring it in a 
dreamland. The circle is not perfect. Fiction cuts across it.”13
In its jurisprudential content Derrida’s “Force of Law” essay is far re-
moved from de Certeau’s literary-theoretical reading. In the hermeneutic 
operations that it performs on its object, however, Derrida’s discourse 
remains close to de Certeau’s, giving a sense of the transdisciplinary 
character of poststructuralist theorizing.14 The basic phenomenologi-
cal operation remains constant: the occlusion of Being through the 
formalized projection of knowledge, setting the scene for hermeneutic 
disclosure. Here though it is organized via the topos of the difference 
between justice and law. In this setting, law goes proxy for the ossifying 
effects of a projected formalism, while justice inherits the fluid and in-
calculable attributes of occluded Being. In Derrida’s essay, however, the 
duality is transformed into an abstractional operation via the traditional 
philosophical exercise of the antinomy or aporia, that is, the holding of 
jointly valid but mutually contradictory theses: 
In fact there is only one aporia, only one potential aporetic that infinitely 
distributes itself. I shall only propose a few examples that will suppose, make 
explicit or perhaps produce a difficult and unstable distinction between justice 
and droit, between justice (infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign 
to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotopic) and the exercise of justice as law 
or right, legitimacy or legality, stabilisable and statutory, calculable, a system of 
regulated and coded prescriptions.15
For Derrida it is the aporetic character of law that opens it to deconstruc-
tion: “It is the deconstructible structure of law (droit), or if you prefer 
justice as droit, that also insures the possibility of deconstruction.”16 At 
the same time, though, he also invokes the Husserlian ancestry of this 
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particular aporetic by referring to it as the e−poche−; that is, the exercise 
that requires the suspension of quotidian forms of judgment in order 
to allow occluded Being to manifest itself free of all projected concepts 
and designs. The central aporia or e−poche− that Derrida performs is one 
that he scripts for the relation between “freedom” and “rule.” According 
to this script, in order to be just, judges in courts of law must exercise a 
freedom in applying the rule or law that amounts in fact to reinventing 
it; but they must also simultaneously judge in accordance with the rule 
or law in order to avoid irresponsibility. This allows Derrida to suspend 
law in a web of mutually contradictory affirmations, of the kind that is 
correctly seen as a distinguishing discursive feature of the deconstruc-
tive variant of poststructuralist theory: “In short, for a decision to be 
just and responsible, it must, in its proper moment if there is one, be 
both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve the law and also 
destroy it or suspend it enough to reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, at 
least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation 
of its principle.”17
The resultant fact that justice may only be glimpsed in the act of 
suspended judgment allows this deconstruction of law to stake a claim 
to a certain kind of antinomian political radicalism.18 It means that no 
actual or “present” legal judgment can be just: “It follows from this 
paradox that there is never a moment that we can say in the present 
that a decision is just . . . or that someone is a just man—even less, ‘I 
am just.’”19 Conversely, the only just legal order is one that can never 
be present—that remains both futural and unpresentable—seen only 
obliquely and unintentionally, in glimpses of an unnameable event: 
“Justice remains, is yet, to come, à venir, it has an, it is à-venir, the very 
dimension of events irreducibly to come. . . . Justice as the experience 
of absolute alterity is unpresentable, but it is the chance of the event 
and the condition of history.”20 If we regard this aporetic exercise as a 
kind of inner ritual set as a task for Derrida’s readers, then it is one 
designed to allow them to transform their relation to law by treating 
it as occluding their own access to a justice whose central attribute is 
that it may never be present to their quotidian selves. Negative theology 
begets negative jurisprudence.
We might say then that de Certeau’s literary poststructuralism oper-
ates as a concrete exercise in which the metaphysics of occluded Being 
and its unforeseeable self-manifestation is operationalized as an inner 
ritual through the philosophical-hermeneutic reading of a literary text: a 
text that the reading imbues with the formal order and the unexpected 
indeterminacy required for this exercise. For its part, Derrida’s decon-
struction of law takes place through an exercise in which the aporetic 
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balancing of the incalculability of justice and the certainty of law permits 
a suspension not just of philosophical judgment but of all “present” 
legal orders. This opens a space in which a permanently futural justice 
might unexpectedly disclose itself in the form of an event capable of 
transforming those who behold it. 
So, two documents to work with. How might it be possible then to 
provide an historical characterization of poststructuralist theorizing that 
locates it in a historical context without engaging in the hermeneutic 
reduction that treats it as the intellectual symptom of a hidden histori-
cal reality? It is possible to do so, I suggest, by drawing on a form of 
intellectual history that approaches philosophies in terms of the acts 
of self-transformation and self-cultivation that they require. This is the 
approach that informs Pierre Hadot’s studies of classical philosophies 
as “ways of life,” that is exploited in Peter Brown’s elegant investiga-
tions of late-ancient and early-Christian philosophical asceticism, and 
that Michel Foucault has nominated as the investigation of practices of 
“spirituality” within philosophy.21
Foucault has characterized this philosophical spirituality as “the search, 
practice, and experience through which the subject carries out neces-
sary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth,” 
and he locates its ascetic trigger in the doctrine or insistence that the 
quotidian subject is not qualified for access to higher truth without 
undertaking such a transformation. The dimension of spirituality that 
drives certain forms of philosophy can thus be understood in terms of 
“the set of these researches, practices, and experiences, which may be 
purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of looking, 
modifications of existence, etc., which are, not for knowledge but for 
the subject . . . the price to be paid for access to the truth.”22 By rede-
scribing philosophizing as a particular kind of activity—as a work of the 
self carried out on the self for the purpose of transforming its mode 
of acceding to truth—this approach allows us to treat poststructuralist 
theorizing as a concrete historical reality rather than as an intellectual 
symptom of one. This in turn enables us to view its context in terms of 
the circumstances in which the activity is carried out and the cultural 
movements or institutions that program these circumstances, rather than 
in terms of the hermeneutic relation between an intellectual symptom 
and its unconscious material determinations. 
Viewed in this light, then, our snapshots of de Certeau and Derrida 
may be regarded as pictures of particular acts of intellectual self-trans-
formation and self-cultivation. Let us suggest that here we are dealing 
with a certain kind of “spiritual exercise” in which the exercitant is firstly 
required to withdraw from quotidian knowledge and value—literary 
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veridicality, the “present” legal order—thence to enter the state of sus-
pended judgment or illuminated openness. Here it might be possible 
for a spiritually uncontaminated phenomenon to appear unexpectedly, 
as the “other,” the “event,” the eschaton that transforms the one who 
beholds it. This might be regarded as an exercise in the “conversion 
of looking.”
It should be clear that in offering this characterization of poststructur-
alist theorizing we are not attempting to falsify it. Viewed as a concrete 
historical activity—that is, seen in the persona of an empirical historian—
such theorizing is no more capable of being false than is chess, yoga, or 
the Eucharist, and, by the same token, no more capable of being true. 
What we are doing, rather, is seeking to transform the register in which 
poststructuralism is understood: from that of a theory that might be 
true or false to that of an irrefragable activity, whose character is open 
to historical description and whose contextual circumstances are open 
to historical investigation that might indeed be true or false. Of course 
this shift results in a dramatic change of outlook, as it means that an 
intellectual discipline dedicated to disclosing the pristine indetermi-
nacy beneath empirical reality is itself treated as an empirical reality 
of a particular kind, hence as an object for an empirically oriented 
intellectual history. I have indicated that the acts of self-transformation 
and self-cultivation present in poststructuralist theorizing emerge from 
developments in post-Kantian metaphysics. Now I want to look at three 
snapshots of these developments, taken at Davos in 1929, Freiburg in 
1933, and Baltimore in 1966.
II. Davos 1929
In order to get some sense of what was at stake in the contest between 
Kantian philosophy and the post-Kantian philosophy of Husserl and 
Heidegger, we can turn to the debate between Ernst Cassirer and Heide-
gger that took place in the Swiss alpine spa of Davos on 26 March 1929. 
This event was attended by two hundred mainly German and French 
academics and students, and formed part of an “International University 
Course” sponsored by the Swiss, French, and German governments with 
a view to improving relations between Francophone and Germanophone 
academics.23 Among the academics were Rudolf Carnap, Joachim Ritter, 
Eugen Fink, and Jean Cavaillès, while the students included a young 
Emmanuel Levinas and possibly a youngish Herbert Marcuse, both of 
whom were undertaking spiritual apprenticeships in Heideggerian phi-
losophy. Were this debate to have taken place wholly in the register of 
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philosophy—as a clash between conflicting interpretations of Kant and 
thence competing epistemological theories—then it would be difficult 
to understand either how it could have galvanized and polarized the 
two hundred spectating minds, or how it could continue to echo in rival 
academic discipleships today. If, though, we approach the contesting 
philosophies as informed by rival “spiritualities,” or competing ways of 
qualifying quotidian selves for access to higher truth, then the magne-
tism of the spectacle starts to becomes graspable. For now the debate 
appears in the form of a contest between rival spiritual-philosophical 
exemplars, personified by Cassirer and Heidegger, each modeling the 
kind of mind into which one should transform oneself in order to ac-
cede to the highest kind of truth.
Without going into a level of detail incompatible with our present 
purposes, it is necessary to sketch the briefest of accounts of what it was 
about Kant’s metaphysics that permitted it to undergo two such opposed 
receptions.24 In his militant reaction to both empirical science and exist-
ing Protestant university metaphysics, Kant executed an extraordinary 
dual reshaping of the “rational being” that had long stood at the center 
of German university metaphysics: that is, man as the harbinger of an 
intellectual nature, created by the intellection of a divine mind, and 
hence capable of participating in divine intellection in his diminished 
creaturely capacity. On the one hand, Kant ascribed to man the posses-
sion of a pure apperceptive intelligence from whose synthetic activity 
the categorial forms of all knowledge emerged and from whose freely 
self-determining will issued the moral law.25 On the other hand, in a 
disturbingly difficult conceit, Kant viewed space and time as this rational 
being’s sensorium or intuitional apparatus.26 This means that the ap-
pearance of objects in space and time might be regarded as the manner 
in which the pure intellections of man the creative intelligence (homo 
noumenon) are apprehended through the spatial and temporal sensorium 
of man the subject of passive intuition (homo phenomenon).27
The interaction between the active intellect and the passive sensorium 
is handled in Kant’s difficult and shifting conception of the transcen-
dental imagination, treated somewhat differently in the first and second 
editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. To this faculty Kant ascribes the 
capacity of rendering figural, via the “transcendental schematism,” the 
otherwise abstract relations of the transcendental intellect.28 It is not our 
purpose to attempt to clarify this conception here, only to note the two 
different ways in which Kant appears to understand it, and in which it 
has been understood since. On the one hand, the figurations effected by 
the transcendental imagination—the transcendental schematisms—can 
be regarded as products of the synthetic activity of the pure intellect, 
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as when the shape of a triangle is conceived as the product of a priori 
rules of construction. On the other hand, the figuration of things can be 
thought of as the product of the temporal and spatial forms of passive 
intuition, such that the triangle is only grasped as a shape through the 
manner in which the “reproductive imagination” synthesizes or associ-
ates perceptions in time. 
The only reason for dwelling on this unresolved bifurcation in Kant’s 
conception of the transcendental imagination is that it helps to clarify 
the opposed Kant receptions of Cassirer and Heidegger that were on 
display at Davos in March 1929. As the leading inheritor of Marburg neo-
Kantianism, Cassirer conceived the figuralization of things in space and 
time as the product of purely formal intellectual relations, in a manner 
that marginalized independent spatio-temporal intuition. By constru-
ing these formal relations as the “symbolic forms” through which man 
projects an array of objective sciences or cultural meanings, Cassirer 
sought to dissolve substantial Being into a plurality of relational forms 
or structures.29 In this way he modeled the epistemological deportment 
that would later characterize the moment of structuralist theory in the 
humanities. It was on this basis that Cassirer distinguished his position 
from Heidegger’s at Davos: 
Being in ancient metaphysics was substance, what forms a ground. Being in 
the new metaphysics is, in my language, no longer the Being of a substance, 
but rather the Being which starts from a variety of functional determinations 
and meanings. And the essential point which distinguishes my position from 
Heidegger’s appears to me to lie here.30
The famous difficulty of Heidegger’s philosophical repudiation of this 
neo-Kantian structuralism arises from its gnostic character, that is, from 
its tying of philosophical truth to the purifying elevation of a rare and 
privileged subject of truth. In rejecting Cassirer’s transcendental-structur-
alist reception of Kant, Heidegger made use of an esoteric metaphysical 
doctrine that remained deeply but obscurely present in Kant: namely, 
the doctrine that time (and space) should be understood as the “pure 
self-affection” of Being. The core idea in Kant is that our inner empiri-
cal intuition of ourselves as temporal beings (homo phenomenon) arises 
because we are “affected by ourselves” as rational beings (homo noumenon), 
which means that our empirical self can never directly know the rational 
self whose “self-affection” it is.31 In Heidegger this becomes the doctrine 
that a pure nontemporal intelligence only becomes aware of itself in 
the temporal world that it intelligizes but, in doing so, is, as he puts it, 
“thrown” or ejected into time: what Heidegger calls the “thrownness of 
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Being.”32 Here this nontemporal intelligence can only appear to itself 
as one temporal being among others, even though it remains oriented 
to the dimly remembered transcendent-infinite Being from whence it 
has fallen into time and consciousness of itself as being here.
It is this conception of human being awakening to itself as a finite 
being thrown into the temporal world that Heidegger baptized as Da-
sein, or “there-being.” And it was this conception that he deployed as a 
weapon against Cassirer’s conception of man as the transcendental font 
of the forms of experience:
I believe that what I describe by Dasein does not allow translation into any 
concept of Cassirer’s. . . . What I call Dasein . . . depends on . . . the original 
unity and the immanent structure of the relatedness of a human being which 
to a certain extent has been fettered in a body and which, in the fetteredness 
in the body, stands in a particular condition of being bound up with beings. 
In the midst of this it finds itself, not in the sense of a spirit which looks down 
on it, but rather in the sense that Dasein, thrown into the midst of beings, as 
free, carries out an incursion into being which is always spiritual and, in the 
ultimate sense, accidental.33
In this passage we have a snapshot of Heidegger’s reconstruction of the 
mode of acceding to metaphysical truth and a program for the act of 
self-transformation required to become the special kind of self capable of 
acceding to truth of this kind. In repositioning man as a pure intelligence 
that only comes to oblique awareness of its world-creating intellection 
through the senses of the temporal body to which it is fettered, Heide-
gger sought to displace Cassirer’s image of man as the transcendental 
intellect.34 Against Cassirer, he stipulates that man cannot accede to the 
truth of Being in the manner of “a spirit which looks down on it,” but 
must do so rather from the viewpoint of the finite being thrown into 
time yet obliquely aware of the infinite Being from whence it has been 
thrown. Through this reconstruction of Kantian metaphysical culture, 
Heidegger sought to transform the mode of acceding to metaphysical 
truth. For Heidegger, truth is acceded to not through scientific-philo-
sophical recovery of the structural conditions of experience, but only 
in the form of those accidental glimpses of recessive Being that bestow 
on man (Dasein) the brief but highest moments of his existence: “[It 
is] so accidental that the highest form of the existence of Dasein is only 
allowed to lead back to very few and rare glimpses of Dasein’s duration 
between living and death. [It is] so accidental that man exists only in 
very few glimpses of the pinnacle of his own possibility, but otherwise 
moves in the midst of his beings.”35
new literary history502
I want to suggest that in Heidegger’s gnostic reconstruction of the 
mode of acceding to metaphysical truth we can find the intellectual 
core of poststructuralist theorizing. Heidegger reconstituted truth as 
something occluded by the formal structures of knowledge, as something 
to which temporally fettered man can only accede in the accidental 
disclosures of Being that break through such structures, or appear fit-
fully in their interstices or at their margins. In doing so he provided 
the template for an esoteric spiritual exercise that proved capable of 
exoteric reception in a variety of academic disciplines, two examples of 
which we have just seen: in de Certeau’s literary hermeneutics of occlu-
sion and accidental disclosure and Derrida’s deconstructive meditation 
on an unpresentable justice “to come.”
III. Freiburg 1933
At this point, literary sociologists and Marxist theorists would be quite 
within their disciplinary rights to demand a more socially ramified ac-
count of this emergence of poststructuralist theorizing. After all, thus far 
we have only offered a rough sketch of the transmission of a particular 
kind of spiritual-philosophical culture; the role of the combative cultiva-
tion of exemplary intellectual personae through this culture; and the 
capacity of this initially esoteric philosophical culture to enter other 
academic disciplines and produce “theoretical” variants of them. Surely 
this set of developments must itself have been governed by more deep-
seated social and historical transformations, in the structure of society, 
for example, or the mode of economic or literary production? And 
surely it is such transformations that will permit us to grasp the hidden 
significance of the emergence of poststructuralism from the perspective 
of a historical trajectory whose ultimate destination will show us what 
poststructuralism really meant? As Jameson complains: “Somehow, for this 
sociology of ideas, the students being trained in theory are a legitimate 
part of the object of study, while the larger historical moment [of late 
capitalism] in which they are themselves formed is not.”36
We can begin to respond to this quite understandable complaint by 
observing that while it is indeed necessary to extend investigation of 
poststructuralism beyond the horizon of formative pedagogies, these 
nonetheless remain indispensable. This is in part because whatever its 
utility as an abstract means of characterizing economic relations, “late 
capitalism” itself forms nobody, as it is not a concept that engages the 
historical instruments of moral pedagogy or aesthetic self-cultivation. It 
is also because investigating the historical-social anchorage of poststruc-
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turalist cultivation does not involve the revelation of its hidden truth 
through the thinking of something presently unthought: a “political 
unconscious,” an occluded Being, a repressed Other. Rather it involves 
the tracing of its multilateral relations to an array of other cultural and 
political phenomena that are not unconscious but simply underinves-
tigated. 
Were we to discuss the wider dissemination of Heideggerian philosophy 
in the universities of Nazi Germany—and here we can do little more 
than gesture towards this—then the object of our concern would not 
be Heidegger’s class position or the manner in which his philosophy’s 
alleged failure to think its own unthought material conditions turned 
it into the ideological expression of Nazism.37 Rather our focus would 
be on the manner in which the extraordinary political polarization of 
the interwar years, accompanied by extreme ideological polarization 
and penetration of public authorities and civil associations, impacted 
on the universities. Here it politicized appointments and examination 
procedures and induced a prevailing sense of cultural crisis to which 
philosophy and the Geisteswissenschaften felt impelled to respond.38 
Up until 1933 this led to a highly fluid cultural-political environment 
in which rival ideological and intellectual factions battled each other on 
faculty appointment committees and examination boards. If this permit-
ted Heidegger to wage his associated campaigns against neo-Kantians 
and “liberals” through influence peddling and highly tendentious referee 
reports, then the social democrats and neo-Kantians supported their 
candidates via the same means.39 Even after 1933 the highly factional-
ized and “polycratic” character of the Nazi regime meant that there was 
no single delineation of a Nazi philosophy to which Heidegger might 
have claimed the mantle. At the same time, from 1933 onwards a series 
of politically and racially discriminatory citizenship laws allowed for the 
purging of socialists, liberals, and Jews from the universities, resulting 
inter alia in Cassirer’s dismissal from Hamburg as a “non-Aryan” (rather 
than as a neo-Kantian).40 What is striking in this situation is the manner in 
which an array of philosophical positions bearing the theological imprint 
of German metaphysics—neo-Kantianism, transcendental phenomenol-
ogy, existentialism, Heideggerianism—moved beyond their technical 
concerns in order to diagnose a spiritual crisis of the age to which they 
offered rival solutions, often in the form of “political religions” that 
could be adopted by the party war machines.41 It was this philosophical 
transmutation of Germany’s political crisis into a universal spiritual crisis 
that informed the competing philosophical spiritualities presented by 
Cassirer and Heidegger at Davos, and that Heidegger could advance 
in the 1930s when the consolidation of Nazi rule in the universities 
presented him with an increasingly clear field.
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Four years after Davos, then, on 27 May 1933, Heidegger could use 
his inaugural lecture as Rektor-Führer of Freiburg University to show how 
his otherwise esoteric philosophy could be used to tie the spiritual trans-
formation of the nation’s university students to the spiritual awakening 
of the German people promised by Nazism. In a direct transposition of 
his new regime of truth onto the academic hierarchy of the university, 
Heidegger told the Freiburg students that the questioning of Being or 
e−poche− is not that which finds an answer in the positive sciences, but is an 
attunement to the self-disclosure of Being that dissolves all such “ontic” 
sciences into a “fundamental ontology”: “Such questioning shatters the 
division of the sciences into rigidly separated specialties, carries them 
back from their endless and aimless dispersal into isolated fields and 
corners, and exposes science once again to the fertility and the blessing 
bestowed by all the world-shaping powers of human-historical being (Da-
sein).” If the academic body wills the “essence of science” in this sense, 
then it will “create for our people its world . . . that is, its truly spiritual 
world. For ‘spirit’ is . . . primordially attuned, knowing resoluteness to-
ward the essence of Being.”42 Heidegger had already characterized this 
breaching of the positive sciences in pursuit of Being as “theoretical”—
thereby establishing the meaning of “theory” later found in the Ameri-
can humanities graduate school—and, significantly, identified this as a 
“comportment”: “Theoretical comportment is a process first because it 
flows through a chain of grounding, but second because it tears itself 
from the contexture of life with ever novel spontaneity.”43
As Heidegger made clear, the immediate context for his inaugural 
exhortation was the Nazi neue Studentenrecht (new Student Law) that had 
been proclaimed a few weeks earlier on May 1.44 In envisaging a politi-
cal mobilization of the student body in the service of national spiritual 
renewal, this law provided Heidegger with the opportunity to advance 
his own program of spiritual transformation oriented to forming the 
theoretical comportment: “The third bond of the student body binds it 
to the spiritual mission of the German people. This people shapes its 
fate by placing its history into the openness of the overwhelming power 
of all the world-shaping powers of the human being (Dasein) and by ever 
renewing the battle for its spiritual world.”45 Heideggerian philosophy 
was thus not joined to Nazism by a law-like historical dialectic that has 
moved us beyond such a nexus through the progressive clarification of 
the “political unconscious” on which it was supposedly based. Rather, 
this linkage was forged in an unpredictable and uncertain cultural-
political program designed to integrate a crucial feature of Heidegger’s 
philosophical culture—its capacity to mobilize students around self-
transformational striving to achieve the theoretical comportment—with 
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the larger program of political mobilization entailed by the Nazi reforms 
of the university.
When in the 1960s, in the context of a different student movement, 
Marcuse’s Heideggerian Marxism was deployed as a mobilizing phi-
losophy, this too assumed the form of the contingent articulation of 
an exemplary culture of spiritual self-transformation to a particular 
program of political mobilization.46 Of course the changed geopolitical 
and geointellectual circumstances in which this took place—the fact 
that now the theoretical comportment was attached to the mobiliza-
tional politics of American antistate university activists (the “New Left”) 
rather than the mobilizational politics of the Nazi party-state—meant 
that “theory” assumed a quite different cultural-political significance 
and valency. Nonetheless, no less than Heidegger’s, Marcuse’s “theory” 
emerged from the combination of academic-spiritual self-cultivation and 
factional political mobilization. As such, it owed its American flourish-
ing not to its greater success in thinking an unthought that had eluded 
Heidegger, but to something else altogether: namely, the military defeat 
of the Nazi’s Tausendjähriges Reich by the American and Soviet empires. 
It was this pure contingency of history that had permitted Marcuse to 
transpose Heidegger’s self-transformative philosophical culture into 
the new geopolitical and geointellectual circumstances represented by 
the elite American graduate school. In short, while we can agree that 
our sketch of the history of poststructuralist theory requires a far more 
ramified account of its social and political anchorage than we have yet 
provided, such an account will lead not to a thinking of theory’s un-
thought material conditions, but to something else entirely: an investiga-
tion of theory’s various emergences from the contingent transposition 
of its culture of spiritual self-transformation into unforeseen cultural 
and political contexts with unpredictable consequences.
IV. Baltimore 1966
In turning to our third snapshot of the emergence of poststructuralist 
theory—taken from the symposium on “The Languages of Criticism and 
the Sciences of Man” held at the Johns Hopkins University from 18–21 
October 1966—we are struck by its differences from the Davos sympo-
sium, but also by its similarities to the earlier event. Davos represented 
the government-sponsored gathering of a European intellectual elite, 
convened on neutral ground between the wars, to facilitate exchanges 
between the academic cultures of neighboring hostile powers, Germany 
and France. The Hopkins symposium formed a quite different intellec-
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tual-historical context: namely, the utilization of a culturally powerful 
elite American university as a reception- and dissemination-context 
for French theory of the 1960s. At the same time, though, if we view 
it from the perspective of the paper that would become its talismanic 
centerpiece—Derrida’s “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences”—then the Hopkins symposium displays an uncanny 
similarity to the Davos event. For not only did Derrida repeat Heidegger’s 
proclamation of the eclipse of neo-Kantian structuralism, but he did so 
in the form of a “debate” with the absent doyen of French structural-
ism, Claude Lévi-Strauss, using a metaphysics that was almost wholly 
Heideggerian. If poststructuralist theory can be historically understood 
in terms of the assimilation of post-Kantian metaphysics into French 
theory, and thence its reception in the elite United States humanities 
academy, then the presentation of Derrida’s “Structure, Sign and Play” 
paper to the Hopkins symposium offers us an important snapshot of 
this transpositional context.
One of the striking features of Derrida’s characterization of the intel-
lectual transformation that he was announcing is his treatment of it as 
an unexpected “event.” Derrida portrayed this event as signifying the 
eclipse of the “metaphysics of presence” that is supposedly still embed-
ded in structuralism, and as disclosing a truth only capable of being 
glimpsed fitfully in an unnameable birth:
Here there is a sort of question . . . of which we are only glimpsing today the 
conception, the formation, the gestation, the labor. I employ these words with a glance 
toward those who turn their eyes away in the face of the as yet unnameable 
which is proclaiming itself . . . only under the species of the non-species, in the 
formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity.47
If this formulation echoes Heidegger’s template remark—that “the high-
est form of the existence of Dasein is only allowed to lead back to very 
few and rare glimpses of Dasein’s duration between living and death”—
then that is no accident. Derrida’s framing of the paper and all of the 
hermeneutic operations performed within it are virtuoso instantiations 
of Heidegger’s post-Kantian mode of acceding to metaphysical truth. 
This we recall is the mode in which the philosopher looks on himself 
as thrown into historical time through the “self-affection” of a recessive 
Being that can thus never be “present” in temporal experience; except, 
that is, for the fitful glimpses of the “unnameable,” disclosed to someone 
at the pinnacle of man’s possibility. By presenting his paper as a naming 
of unnameable Being, Derrida was thus offering a public performance 
of the exemplary act of Heideggerian spiritual self-transformation. This 
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allowed Derrida himself to appear before his American audience as 
the higher self who has been touched by renovatory Being—echoing 
Heidegger’s self-presentation at Davos—and thereby qualified to lead 
others to intellectual renewal. 
Historicized in this manner, the Hopkins presentation of “Structure, 
Sign and Play” will not appear as a crucial illuminative “event” that 
revolutionized Western intellectual history: that is, the ruptural event by 
which the structuralist “metaphysics of presence” was shattered through 
Derrida’s rare glimpse into an unnameable recessive Being.48 Rather, 
the delivery of this paper will be approached as a contingent historical 
event in which a regional mode of acceding to truth, improvised within 
the spiritual culture of post-Kantian European university metaphysics, 
was modeled for an elite audience of American humanities intellectuals, 
who were addressed as potential initiates and disseminators. It is via this 
contextualization that we can arrive at an historical understanding of 
the intellectual operations performed within the paper itself.
The central feature of the paper in this regard is its extensive use of 
the aporia or antinomy as the means of executing the e−poche− or skeptical 
suspension of positive knowledge that lies at the heart of this exercise. 
In “Structure, Sign and Play” Derrida engages in the aporia in order to 
perform the suspension of positive knowledges and the destruction of the 
“metaphysics of presence”—Heidegger’s “clearing of the ground.” The 
object of this exercise is ethical and existential before it is epistemic: the 
philosopher’s inducement in himself of the state of floating attunement 
to unnameable Being whose fleeting self-disclosure promises radical self-
transformation. Derrida’s central aporia is performed on the neo-Kantian 
conception of structure itself, elaborating a discourse that situates it 
at the nexus of mutually contradictory imperatives. Derrida stipulates 
that, on the one hand, the role of the principle of “structurality” is to 
determine the play of possibilities in a totality for which the structure 
constitutes a center that is not part of this play. At the same time he 
declares, on the other hand, that to maintain its role, the structuring 
center may not itself be subject to the “principle of structurality” or 
determination that defines the totality. This then gives rise to Derrida’s 
central aporia or paradox, that the structure or center is both within 
the totality yet outside it: “The centre is at the centre of the totality, and 
yet, since the centre does not belong to the totality . . . the totality has 
its centre elsewhere. The centre is not the centre.”49
Once structuralism has been incorporated into this aporetic exercise 
then its claims to scientific knowledge can be suspended via the paradox 
to which they have been made to lead. This allows Derrida to interpose 
that it is not knowledge that lies at the base of structuralism but desire, 
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specifically the desire to escape the “anxiety” arising from the fact that 
Being eludes all attempts at its structural determination. In this way, fol-
lowing Heidegger, Derrida can nominate “metaphysics” as the attempt 
to allay the anxiety arising from the absence of Being by declaring it to 
be present, for example, as “essence, existence, substance, subject.”50 All 
of these have been used to anchor the center of structure in a present 
origin or telos—a “transcendental signified”—yet each only expresses 
the desire to quell the anxiety arising from its absence. If, though, as 
our redescription suggests, anxiety over inaccessible Being is a product 
of the aporetic spiritual exercise designed to induce it in the philoso-
pher, then Derrida’s critique of structuralism as “metaphysics” should 
be understood as the elaboration of a rival philosophical spirituality that 
is itself grounded in Heideggerian metaphysics.
The intellectual “event” or “rupture” that Derrida announces to his 
audience is thus one that takes place through the performance of the 
antinomy that suspends (neo-Kantian) structural determination in the 
paradox of “the centre is not the centre.” It is through this performance 
that Derrida can identify this event with the application of the principle 
of structurality to structure itself, and thence with the admittance of 
language or discourse into the structural sciences, as now structure 
itself can be declared to be subject to the “play” of meaning. In this 
setting, discourse will be understood in terms of the ceaseless detour 
or différance of meaning in relation to a permanently inaccessible Being 
or “transcendental signified,” to which it nonetheless remains oriented: 
“This moment was . . . that in which, in the absence of a centre or 
origin, everything became discourse . . . that is to say, when everything 
became a system where the central signified, the original transcendental 
signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences.”51 
In other words, at Hopkins “discourse” was introduced into the human 
sciences in accordance with the spiritual exercise required by the culture 
of Heideggerian metaphysics.
Seen from an historical perspective, then, Derrida’s Hopkins paper 
can be understood as a snapshot of a dual regional transposition of 
post-Kantian European university metaphysics. It represented the trans-
atlantic geointellectual transposition of a metaphysical culture that had 
previously been regionally “continental” European, owing to the fact 
that—unlike the German—the English and American early-modern 
religious settlements had been largely hostile to metaphysics.52 At the 
same time it represented a discursive transposition of the explicitly 
metaphysical arguments in which Cassirer and Heidegger engaged at 
Davos into a much broader literary-theoretical hermeneutic register, of 
the kind that we have noted in de Certeau. As the instrument and effect 
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of this transposition, a certain kind of “literary theory” would thus be 
enabled to act as a vehicle for the exercise in Heideggerian metaphysical 
self-transformation, with the result that “continental philosophy” would 
enter the United States humanities academy—thence the British and 
Australian—initially through the beachheads provided by literature and 
language departments.
In fact this discursive transposition had already been anticipated by 
Heidegger at Davos in his comment that “art itself has a metaphysical 
sense.”53 The more Heidegger focused on metaphysics as an exercise 
through which initiates could learn to attune themselves to unplannable 
glimpses of incalculable Being, the less dependent this became on spe-
cifically philosophical terminology and argumentation. Heidegger’s own 
postwar transposition of his metaphysics into a literary hermeneutics—
facilitated by the translation of his recondite philosophical vocabulary 
into accessible literary metaphors—was mirrored in the work of French 
literary phenomenologists, making it possible for the esoteric metaphys-
ics to appear in the exoteric form of literary hermeneutics. Derrida’s 
Hopkins paper sits on the cusp of this transition. In its metaphorical 
philosophico-literary vocabulary—in its discourse of decentered struc-
tures and of meaning detoured from the “transcendental signified” 
through the aporetic structure of discourse—it could look backwards 
to Derrida’s own demanding philosophical discussion of Husserl’s phe-
nomenology, yet forwards to a kind of literary criticism, deconstruction, 
that could be taught to undergraduates as a hermeneutic routine.
Regardless of the exoteric dissemination to come, however, poststruc-
turalist theory would not lose its enclave character. It would continue 
to accede to truth in the form of chance glimpses of a recessive Being 
obtained through the suspension of positive knowledges, in the form 
of the event, the other, an indefinitely deferred literary meaning, a 
permanently deferred “justice to come,” and so on. This means that 
access to these rarely glimpsed truths would remain restricted to those 
who engage in the exercise of suspension in order to attune a self that 
accedes to truth in the form of rare glimpses. The literary poststruc-
turalism that surfaced at Johns Hopkins in 1966 was thus an historical 
avatar of that philosophical spirituality that had sought to outflank 
neo-Kantian structuralism at Davos in 1929 and to suspend the positive 
sciences at Freiburg in 1933, bearing within it an act of spiritual self-
transformation projected as a crisis of knowledge and culture. In viewing 
positive knowledges as veils thrown over the lacunae revealed by their 
own aporia, American literary poststructuralism would continue to ac-
cuse the exponents of such knowledges of evading the “anxiety” of the 
absence of Being—“those who turn their eyes away in the face of the 
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as yet unnameable which is proclaiming itself”—and hence of failing 
to reach the point where “man exists only in very few glimpses of the 
pinnacle of his own possibility.”
Coda: Leipzig 1665
We clearly owe some kind of answer to those who will demand a 
justification for the kind of history we have sketched—that is, a jus-
tification beyond the empirical adequacy and plausibility claimed by 
our redescription and contextualization of poststructuralist theorizing. 
The justification towards which we can gesture in the space remaining, 
though, is not one that will satisfy those for whom all accounts of theory 
must themselves take place as a thinking of their own unthought condi-
tions, thus as a self-reflexive “theory of theory.” Rather then offering 
a theory of theory, this paper has sketched a historiography in which 
the poststructuralist suspension of empirical knowledge is itself treated 
as an object of empirical knowledge.54 Drawing on the work of Peter 
Brown, Pierre Hadot, and (late) Michel Foucault, we have adumbrated 
an empirically oriented intellectual history that treats this suspension or 
e−poche− as a concrete historical activity: in fact as one of the exercises in 
self-transformation carried out through such techniques as the aporia and 
aimed at forming an illuminated way of acceding to truth. The history of 
the performance and transmission of such activities is one that is entered 
on by treating events in time as forming a self-sufficient temporal order, 
independent of transcendental conditions or structuring. Such a history 
is regarded as free of hidden meanings or unconscious determinations, 
and hence as the object not of a hermeneutic historiography but of a 
narrative one that attempts to track empirical relations between various 
kinds of activities, events, and contexts.
This is not to presume, however, that this kind of empirical histo-
riography is itself without conditions or is grounded in some kind of 
self-presenting historical reality. To enter this historical world Western 
Europeans first had to learn how to treat events and activities as untran-
scendable temporal objects of a narrative historiography. In fact, this 
historiography arose not from the incontestable discovery of an empirical 
past, but from a combative intellectual movement that campaigned to 
adopt an empirical disposition or “stance” towards the past.55 Empirical 
historiography thus also required a transformation in the mode of acced-
ing to truth and in the persona of the historian. This transformation took 
place at the level of theological, political, and academic contestation, in 
which different forms of historiography were developed as instruments of 
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diverging intellectual cultures and as weapons of cultural-political com-
bat.56 In other words, the justification for our account of poststructuralist 
theorizing is not to be looked for in a theory of theory aspiring to an 
intellectual reflexivity that might exempt it from historical partiality. It 
is to be found, rather, in a history of historiography that acknowledges 
the cultural and political partiality embedded in the methodological 
form of “contextual” historiography itself.
We can provide a brief pointer to the history of this style of histori-
ography by looking at a work published by the Lutheran historian of 
philosophy Jakob Thomasius—the Schediasma Historicum—published in 
Leipzig in 1665. In this work, Thomasius cultivated an empirical stance 
towards the history of philosophy and theology by combining the latest 
contextualizing techniques of critical-humanist philology with a pugna-
ciously antimetaphysical Protestant pietism.57 It was on this basis that he 
was able to treat a wide array of pagan metaphysics, scholastic theologies, 
and modern philosophies as purely temporal activities to be understood 
contextually, in terms of the circumstances of their composition and 
their effects.58 His specific focus was on the context in which Greek 
metaphysics had been combined with Christian doctrine, initially by the 
Church Fathers, and then by the scholastics who followed them, with 
disastrous consequences for “simple Christian faith.”59 Philosophy and 
theology were thus to be understood not in terms of their metaphysical 
truth or falsity—as that only led to irresolvable sectarian conflicts—but 
as activities occurring in profane historical time: in fact, as the teaching 
activities of the pagan philosophical schools and the Christian scholastic 
universities. It was in this way that Thomasius produced one of the earli-
est historical contextualizations of philosophy.
By treating it as the historical product of the merging of Christian 
doctrine with dualist Greek metaphysics in the scholastic university, 
Thomasius could transpose the bulk of Christian theology into this new 
profane historical space. He viewed theology historically in terms of the 
Christian reception of pagan metaphysical dualisms from which arose an 
array of reconciliatory monistic and pantheistic “heresies.”60 In the case 
of Christian neo-Platonism, for example, Thomasius argued that through 
its emanationism—according to which man emerges as an intellectual 
being from the continuous intellection of the divine mind—this doctrine 
establishes a false continuum between creature and creator.61 In another 
striking move, Thomasius argued that through this false continuum, 
Christian neo-Platonism had given rise to a heterodox practice of self-
sanctification. This took shape in the form of practices of self-purification 
through which the adept strove to shed their material selves and rise to 
meet the pure intellect from which they had devolved, thereby dispensing 
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with the mediation of Christ and the church.62 In treating this practice 
as the source of an “enthusiast” comportment in which philosophical 
adepts strove for union with God, Thomasius may be regarded as offer-
ing an early example of the historiographic redescription of philosophy 
in terms of self-transformative spiritual exercises.
We have already encountered what appear to be quasi-emanationist 
doctrines in the preceding discussion. Kant’s dualistic metaphysics—
according to which empirical man (homo phenomenon) is the form in 
which a self-affecting pure intelligence (homo noumenon) appears to its 
passive self—would seem to be a development from early modern neo-
Platonism.63 In viewing man as thrown into a temporal world of beings 
that affords him only fitful (yet transformative) glimpses of the Being 
from whence he has been thrown, Heidegger’s metaphysics would ap-
pear to be another such development.64 Will it prove a feasible avenue 
for historical inquiry to approach poststructuralist theorizing as the 
most recent development of this metaphysical culture, whose central 
role is to program a self-transformative exercise in acceding to illumi-
nistic truth?
Already in the generation of historians of philosophy that followed 
Jakob Thomasius in the 1690s—Daniel Colberg, Gottfried Arnold, and 
Christian Thomasius—the notion that the philosophical theologies were 
heresies had dropped from sight, in keeping with the transformation 
of heresy into a purely historical concept through which the orthodox 
had stigmatized the heterodox. This was even more pronounced in the 
generation of historians that followed them, which included Isaac de 
Beausobre and Johann Mosheim, and would lead on to Gibbon and 
Hume and ultimately, perhaps, to the Cambridge School. This change 
was not least due to the fact that the more deeply these historians em-
bedded philosophical theologies (and theological philosophies) in a 
purely immanent history of their teaching in churches, universities, and 
sects, the less pertinent became the question of their truth or falsity.65 
What did remain pertinent, though, was the redescription of them as 
intellectual practices giving rise to characteristic kinds of spiritual com-
portment, which were increasingly viewed in terms of their suitability 
for particular conceptions of postconfessional civil life. Will it prove 
to be the case that the kind of contextualist intellectual history from 
which this paper has drawn its snapshots of poststructuralist theorizing 
is a late development of this profane antimetaphysical historiography 
of philosophy? Considering the horizons opened by these possibilities it 
is appropriate to close our discussion with these questions rather than 
their answers.
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